





















First,	 drawing	on	Mumford	 (2006)	 and	Collins	 (2012)	we	argue	 that	officials	 cannot	make	15	
reliable	judgments	about	scrums	because	they	cannot	see	what	they	need	to	see.	Secondly,	16	
we	argue	that	players	cannot	follow	the	laws	of	the	scrum	even	if	they	have	a	strong	desire	17	
to	 do	 so.	 Laws	 which	 can’t	 be	 followed	 are,	 according	 to	 Fuller	 (2000)	 defective.	18	










scientists,	 referees	and	governing	bodies	have	been	working	hard	over	 the	years	 to	make	29	
rugby	 union	 in	 general,	 and	 scrummaging	 in	 particular,	 safer.	 Changes	 include	 law	30	





































referee	 believed	Welsh	 players	 had	 pushed	 their	 opponents	 out	 of	 the	 line	 intentionally	29	
(infringement).	The	television	images,	however,	clearly	showed	that	two	New	Zealand	players	30	



















for	 judgments	 are	 the	 state	 of	 affairs	 in	 the	 world.	 The	 epistemic	 aspect	 refers	 to	 the	9	
judgment	process.	Mumford	(2006)	argues	that	 it	 is	 the	referee’s	 job	to	make	a	 judgment	10	
based	on	facts	in	relation	to	the	laws	of	the	game.	The	referee	adjudges	a	high	tackle	when	11	
player	A	tackles	player	B	above	the	shoulders.	The	referee	got	it	wrong	if	evidence	emerges	12	
that	 the	 tackle	was	 not	 in	 fact	 above	 the	 shoulders.	 The	 final	 aspect	 is	 the	 performative	13	












skills’	 and	 knowledge	 –	 they	 know	 the	 laws	 and	 have	 been	 trained	 to	 apply	 them	 in	26	
accordance	with	the	best	traditions	of	the	practice.		27	
The	referee	no	longer	has	the	superior	view	tout	court.	TV	viewers	can	see	his	mistakes	and	28	




















starting	 play	 following	 a	minor	 infringement	 by	one	 side	or	 other.	 Eight	 specialist	 players	7	
(forwards	–	collectively	known	as	the	pack)	from	each	side	bind	with	each	other	roughly	in	a	8	








physically	 and	 psychologically	 dominate	 their	 opponents.	 In	 recent	 years,	 the	 scrum	 has	17	
become	problematic	because	many	 fail	–	most	often,	 they	collapse	as	 the	 front	 rows	 fold	18	
downwards	(the	cause	of	the	injury	above).	The	cumulative	time	taken	for	scrums	during	any	19	
given	 rugby	 game	 detracts	 from	 the	 spectators’	 enjoyment	 and	 frustrates	 players	 and	20	
coaches.	According	 to	World	Rugby,	 the	average	 time	 taken	per	 scrum	 is	60	 seconds,	 the	21	
average	number	of	scrums	per	international	test	match	is	8-10.	Consequently,	over	10%	of	22	

















collapse.	 Biomechanists	 have	 sought	 to	 measure	 and	 quantify	 the	 forces	 involved	 in	1	
scrummaging	 (mainly	 for	 safety	 purposes),	 but	 even	 in	 the	 lab,	 there	 is	 currently	 no	2	





















































‘one	 knows	 what	 goes	 on	 in	 the	 scrum	 because	 one	 knows	 how	 to	 scrummage’.	 This	15	
explanation	 is	 problematic	 for	 at	 least	 two	 reasons.	 Firstly	 refereeing,	 like	 instructing,	16	
coaching	or	teaching	demands	a	level	of	expertise	about	something	one	cannot	do	oneself.	17	
The	referee	currently	considered	the	best	 in	 the	world,	 like	many	other	 top	referees	 (and	18	
coaches),	did	not	play	in	the	scrum	at	the	elite	level	or	otherwise.14	This	does	not	mean	he	19	
cannot	have	 important	 knowledge	about	 it.	 Secondly,	 referees	do	not	need	 to	be	able	 to	20	


























explanation”	 to	a	“judgmental	 interpretation”	of	 truth	makers	 (Mumford	2006:	182).	 ‘The	7	
referee	 is	 the	 sole	 judge	 of	 fact	 and	 Law	 during	 a	 match’	 embodies	 the	 ‘judgmental	8	
interpretation’.	Once	the	referee,	having	consulted	all	the	resources	available,	makes	a	call,	9	
that	call	cannot	be	overturned.	The	post-match	review	process,	however,	can	judge	that	the	10	
referee	made	poor	calls	 (although	 the	 result	will	 stand).	The	panel	might	give	 the	 referee	11	

















events	 in	 the	sequence	where	 the	 factual	 ‘truth	maker’	was	not	available	or	 is	 in	dispute.	29	
There	were	13	scrums	in	the	sequence	above	and	none	called	against	France.	On	occasions,	30	
the	referee	re-set	the	scrum	because	there	was	no	obvious	offence.	Subsequent	analysis	of	31	
television	 coverage	 validates	 those	 decisions,	 but	 other	 decisions	 are	 significantly	32	






















laws	have	on	players.	 The	 scrum	 is	 a	 contest	within	a	 contest.	 Each	 team	seeks	 to	gain	a	14	
competitive	advantage,	or	at	least	minimise	the	competitive	advantage	of	their	opponents.	15	
The	 scrum	 is	 part	 of	 the	 restorative	 justice	 process20.	 The	 laws	 of	 the	 scrum	 reflect	 this	16	
restorative	 goal	 by	 favouring	 one	 side	 over	 the	 other.	 Coaches	 select	 players	 in	 specific	17	
positions	because	they	have	the	skills	and	stature	that	will	help	translate	structural	advantage	18	
into	competitive	advantage	for	their	team	and	stop	similar	translation	for	their	opponents.	19	








even	 if	 they	 really	want	 to.	 Some	of	what	happens	 to	players’	bodies	during	 the	 scrum	 is	28	





























of	 the	 affected	 party”	 and	 the	 eighth	 is	 “a	 failure	 of	 congruence	 between	 the	 rules	 as	18	
announced	and	their	actual	administration”	(Fuller	2000:	93).	Our	claim	is	that	the	scrum	is	19	
governed	by	laws	that,	on	occasion,	players	simply	cannot	follow.	This	is	an	empirical	claim	20	
about	 forces,	 muscles,	 angles	 and	 not	 a	 claim	 about	 mental	 states	 or	 intentions.	 It	 is	21	
sometimes	impossible	for	individuals	to	withstand	the	forces	and	pressures	generated	by		a	22	
dominant	scrum	created	lawfully	or	unlawfully.	According	to	Fuller	(2000:	93),	there	can	be	23	
no	 rational	 basis	 for	 insisting	 that	 someone	 ought	 to	 obey	 a	 rule	 that	 “commanded	 the	24	
impossible”.	Players,	specialist	coaches	and	even	equipment	manufacturers	work	to	improve	25	










brought	 closer	 together,	 reducing	opportunities	 to	charge	at	one’s	opponent	 (an	unlawful	action).	36	
With	the	2013	change,	prop	forwards	were	further	limited	in	their	pre-scrum	‘shenanigans’,	as	they	37	
had	 to	 pre-bind	 to	 their	 opponent.	 Such	 an	 action	 provides	 officials	 with	 an	 increased	 chance	 of	38	
‘seeing’	binding	infringements.		39	












among	other	 things,	shortening	games	when	the	home	team	 is	ahead,	 lengthening	games	9	
when	they	are	behind	(the	above	game	lasted	20	minutes	longer	than	normal).	We	are	not	10	





escape	 punishment	when	 they	 have	 deliberately	 violated	 the	 laws.	 They	 are	 to	 a	 certain	16	
extent	at	the	mercy	of	both	the	forces	in	the	scrum	(flaw	six)	and	the	referee’s	potentially	17	












transference	 of	moral	 responsibility	 to	 the	 referee,	 ‘It’s	 only	 illegal	 if	 I	 get	 caught’.	 Such	30	
instrumentalism	may	be	disapproved	of	publically,	but	unlawful	acts	that	go	undetected	are	31	
often	 “admired	 and	 approved	 of”	 by	 spectators	 especially	 if	 successful	 (Reddiford	 1998:	32	
225)23.	Given	the	 inherent	 justice	and	safety	 jeopardy	of	 the	scrum	that	we	have	outlined	33	
above,	players	‘do	what	they	have	to	do’	to	survive	and	dominate.	To	this	end,	scrums	are	a	34	
paradigmatic	example	of	a	non-verbal	 ‘moral	dialogue’	 (Haan:	1983)	 in	sport	whereby	the	35	
terms	of	the	interaction	are	‘thrashed	out’	by	the	players’	physical	acts.	There	is	a	dynamic	of	36	
pressure,	resistance,	force,	counter-force	as	both	packs	seek	to	dominate	each	other	and	get	37	




‘competitive	 shenanigans’	 to	describe	 tolerated	morally	 questionable	behaviours	 in	 sport.	1	








strategy	 has	 a	 degree	 of	 jeopardy	 attached	 because	 the	 players	 are	 operating	 under	 the	10	
















above.	 The	 scrum	 is	 a	 flawed	 part	 of	 the	 game	 because	 the	 ‘factual	 truth	maker’	 is	 not	27	
available	 for	crucial	and	game-changing	 incidents.	 In	 the	great	scheme	of	 things,	need	we	28	
really	worry	about	poor	calls?	The	example	we	started	the	paper	with	adds	another	dimension	29	























































































could	 be	 established	 using	methods	 unavailable	 to	 referees	 (testimony	 under	 oath).	 The	19	
barrister	is	asking	whether	someone’s	actions	led	directly	to	the	collapse	of	the	scrum,	could	20	











































and	engage	 in	a	 ‘moral	dialogue’	with	each	other	 that	 involves	 ‘competitive	shenanigans’,	29	
bending	the	rules,	cheating	and	the	use	of	other	means	to	get	the	referee	‘onside’.	Rugby	is	30	
‘just	a	game’	and	nothing	important	beyond	the	game	rests	on	‘game	rules’.	On	the	contrary,	31	
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up	before	his	direct	opponent	(the	defending	tight	head	prop).	XXXXX	recalls	awarding	a	penalty	kick	against	
the	attacking	team	only	to	be	‘told’	by	his	performance	reviewer	that,	while	correct	in	Law,	the	defending	
team	should	have	been	punished	in	order	to	avoid	unnecessary	controversy	(the	call	would	‘look’	wrong).	We	
accept	that	during	a	review,	television	pictures	might	reveal	new	information	that,	if	available	at	the	time,	
could	have	resulted	in	a	different	call,	but	this	is	does	not	challenge	the	thesis	here.		
20	We	could	say	so	much	more	about	this,	but	it	would	take	us	too	far	away	from	the	central	issue.	
21	We	are	very	grateful	to	John	Russell	for	his	valuable	input	in	relation	to	this	point	in	particular,	but	also	to	his	
comments	and	suggestions	on	the	argument	more	generally.			
22	Wales	did	not	select	Gethin	Jenkins	(over	100	caps)	for	a	Test	match	when	it	was	announced	that	a	certain	
French	referee	would	be	officiating.	The	coaches	felt	that	the	referee	had	incorrectly	penalised	Jenkins	on	
numerous	occasions	in	a	recent	club	game	and	took	precautionary	steps	to	avoid	a	repeat.		
23	One	infamous	example	of	this	type	of	behaviour	featured	a	player	called	Neil	Back.	In	2002	at	the	end	of	the	
European	Cup	Final,	Back	deliberately	committed	a	foul	which	would	more	or	less	guarantee	victory	to	his	
team	if	he	got	away	with	it.	He	did	get	away	with	it,	and	his	team	won.	It	was	clear,	however,	to	all	TV	viewers	
that	he	had	offended.	He	was	loath	to	accept	the	label	of	cheat,	instead	describing	his	actions	as	a	form	of	
gamesmanship.		
24	Wales	tight	head	prop	Adam	Jones	was	considered	one	of	the	best	in	the	World	in	his	position.	He	could	
dominate	his	opponents	and	they	were	often	penalised.	A	recent	change	in	the	engagement	sequence	meant	
that	Jones	could	no	longer	dominate.	The	changes	eliminated	Jones’	strategy	of	‘hitting’	and	getting	
immediate	dominance.	http://www.walesonline.co.uk/sport/rugby/rugby-news/adam-jones-wales-axing-
what-7981732	accessed	5/04/2017	
25	Slipping	a	bind	was,	and	is	an	offence,	discussed	earlier	in	the	tribunal.	
26	Tony	Spreadbury	was	a	referee	who	was	attending	the	training	session	at	the	time	to	provide	his	expert	
input	to	assist	with	scrum	practice.	He	was	also	a	paramedic	and	his	actions	saved	Matt	Hampson’s	life.		
27	The	barrister	is	quoting	previous	evidence	by	Richard	Cockerill,	a	coach	and	former	hooker.	
28 In	January	1998,	Richard	Vowles,	29,	was	injured	in	a	local	derby	game.	Consequently,	he	is	now	wheelchair-
bound.	Mr	Vowles	took	the	referee	to	court	for	breach	of	his	duty	to	take	reasonable	care	for	the	safety	of	
front-row	players.	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1416031/Paralysed-rugby-player-wins-high-court-
case.html	accessed	21/07/2017 
	
	
